In this paper we examine the importance of local spillovers such as network externalities and learning from others in the diffusion of home computers. We use data on 110,000 U.S. households in 1997. Controlling for many individual characteristics, we find that people are more likely to buy their first home computer in areas where a high fraction of households already own computers or when a large share of their friends and family own computers. Further results suggest that these patterns are unlikely to be explained by common unobserved traits or by area features. When looked at in more detail, the spillovers appear to come from experienced and intensive computer users. They are not associated with the use of any particular type of software but do seem to be highly tied to the use of e-mail and the Internet, consistent with computers being part of an information or communication network.
I. Introduction
In this paper we empirically examine the importance of local spillovers such as network externalities and learning from others in the diffusion of home computers.
Technology diffusion plays a central role in many theories of development and economic growth. Some recent studies have singled out computer diffusion as an engine of growth and 1 as a potential source of fundamental labor market changes. And network externalities are of 2 recurring interest in industrial organization and public economics. 3 We employ a database on the computer ownership and purchase decisions of more than 110,000 U.S. households. Our notion is that people without computers may learn about the 4 technology from their computer-owning friends and neighbors, or benefit from the size of the local computer "network" because they can share software or communicate with one another.
If so, there may be positive spillovers from existing computer owners to new owners.
Because local households may have traits in common and face similar economic environments, establishing the existence of local spillovers is difficult. People who live in places where a high share of people already own computers may have a greater affinity for technology, even if they do not already own a computer, and therefore may be more likely to become owners. And high adoption may reflect low local computer prices or local prevalence of computer-making and computer-using firms. This problem pervades empirical work on local effects. We will employ several strategies to test whether common traits or common economic environments, as opposed to network or learning benefits, can explain our findings.
The existence of learning or network externalities in computer adoption could have important policy implications. Externalities could mean that the rate of adoption is too slow, possibly justifying public subsidies to computer or Internet adoption or expanded teaching of computer skills in schools. In this spirit, the U.S. government has a number of programs designed to close the "Digital Divide" between users and non-users of the Internet. 5 Externalities would mean such programs have greater overall effect on adoption than their direct effects, since the new adopters induce others to adopt as well. From an efficiency standpoint, subsidies should target those most responsive to subsidies and those conferring the greatest externalities. If externalities come from any amount of use of a home personal computer, then subsidies for first-time household purchases (if feasible) would make more sense than subsidizing all purchases. If externalities instead come from experienced, intensive users then more narrowly targeted subsidies might be warranted. Subsidies might also target adoption within isolated subgroups on the wrong side of the Digital Divide because doing so could affect a larger set of non-users.
An important caveat to drawing any policy implications from evidence on local learning or network spillovers is that such evidence is not the same as evidence of externalities. The recipients of spillover benefits may compensate the providers (e.g., "I'll take you to lunch if you will show me how to use this computer"). In keeping with the existing literature, we will refer to learning and network externalities. Since the distinction between externalities and spillovers is fundamental but unobservable, in this paper we will focus primarily on documenting the spillovers.
In the empirical results that follow, we find evidence consistent with local spillovers in home computer adoption. Using instruments, additional control variables, and a variety of tests and sample periods we find little evidence that the effects are the result of correlated 5 See www.digitaldivide.gov for an overview. See Hausman (1998) for a discussion of the $2.25 billion annual U.S. federal subsidy for public school and library Internet access financed by a special tax on phone service. There have been more ambitious (albeit geographically concentrated) subsidies as well, including the Blackburg Electronic Village program in Virginia and the Information Age Town program in Ennis, Ireland. In these cities attempts were made to put a computer in every household and school and to connect everyone to the Internet (for descriptions of these programs see Yaukey, 1997 and MacCarthaigh, 1997). individual traits within cities, or city features such as industry composition, availability of computer retailers, or level of computer prices.
The data do suggest that the spillovers are concentrated in local areas and among family and friends. The spillovers appear to be greatest from experienced and intensive computer users. The spillovers do not appear to be tied to the use of any particular type of software (spreadsheets, word processors, graphics, games, family budgeting) but are highly tied to the use of e-mail and the Internet. This is consistent with the idea that the computer serves as a part of a local information or communication network.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section II we describe previous work in related areas. In section III we describe the dataset and our empirical specification. In section IV we present OLS estimates of local spillovers. In section V we deploy instruments to deal with possible simultaneity problems. In section VI we investigate the nature of the spillovers and try to identify the source of the network benefits. In section VII we conclude.
II. Related Literature
Network externalities arise when the value of participating in a network increases as more people participate in the network. This could apply to literal networks such as the telephone or e-mail systems, but also to complementary goods such as VCRs and video cassettes. To the extent that there are one-time costs of joining a network or and switching to a different network (e.g., buying a cellular phone compatible with only one type of network), the literature finds that network externalities literature can lead to inefficient outcomes. Such outcomes run the gamut from suboptimally fast adoption to suboptimally slow adoption, from locking-in an inefficient technology to abandoning a superior technology for an inferior one. 6 The classic example of how network externalities can ensconce an inefficient technology is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard. The large number of users of the QWERTY layout allegedly 6 Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1986) provide early analyses of network externalities. makes manufacturers averse to producing a better layout, while the prevalence of QWERTY keyboards allegedly keeps users from wanting to learn a faster layout. 7 Network externalities introduce dynamic considerations for both users and producers.
For users, the adoption decision must take into account the size of the network in the future to avoid being stranded in an unpopular network. Firms have incentive to invest in building proprietary networks from which they can earn rents. Discussion of these types of issues for the Internet browser market arose in the Microsoft antitrust trial (Gilbert and Katz, 2001) , and appear to be at the heart of the battle between Microsoft and AOL over instant messaging networks. Systematic empirical work on network externalities has been relatively rare, however. There has been work on a few industries including numerically controlled machines, spreadsheets, automated teller machines, prescription anti-ulcer drugs, and electronic bank payments. 8 Learning from others can also influence the spread of technology. In his classic study of the diffusion of hybrid corn in the U.S., Griliches (1957) found evidence consistent with late-adopters learning from early-adopters. Controlling for land size and land quality (which 9 affect the incentive to adopt hybrid corn), he found that hybrid corn was adopted earlier where corn farms were closer together. He interpreted this as suggesting that proximity facilitated communication between users and potential adopters, as well as sales visits by hybrid seed sellers. Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) argue that younger workers learn from older workers experienced with older technologies, thereby slowing the diffusion of new technologies. In their model, workers and firms find it optimal to continue investing in human and physical capital specific to the old technology long after the arrival of a superior technology (e.g., steam power rather than electric power). 7 This example is not without controversy. David (1985) forwards the QWERTY hypothesis but Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) challenge its validity. 8 Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) , Gandal (1994) , Saloner and Shepard (1995) , Berndt, Pindyck and Azoulay (2000) , and Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2001) . 9 Recent studies of learning from others have investigated patenting (Jaffe et al. 1993) , memory chip production (Irwin and Klenow, 1994) , and hybrid seed adoption in rural India (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995) .
As the examples above illustrate, a key prediction of models with network externalities and learning spillovers is that the adoption rate among non-adopters increases as the level of cumulative adoption increases. Usefully for empirical work, this prediction is not shared by other leading theories of diffusion. For example, suppose diffusion occurs because the price of acquiring the new technology falls over time. As the price falls the technology is adopted by users who value the technology less and less. In this alternative view, the typical S-shaped diffusion curve may be mapping out the fixed distribution of reservation prices for adopting the technology, with the steep part of the S-curve merely reflecting a convex range of the cumulative distribution. In contrast, the spillovers explanation suggests a positive relationship between the adoption rate and cumulative adoption at of cumulative adoption. We all levels exploit this distinction in our tests below.
III. Data and Empirical Specification

A. Data
The data we use come from a proprietary December 1997 mail survey by Forrester research called . Forrester is a marketing research company specializing in Technographics 98 the information economy. The fieldwork for the survey was conducted by the NPD Group. NPD Group received filled-out questionnaires from more than 110,000 American households on their ownership patterns for computers and other electronic goods. The sampling methodology is proprietary but is meant to ensure a nationally representative sample. We found only modest differences when we cross-checked median income, age, and marital status for several states in the sample against data reported by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1998).
More details on the program can be found in Bernhoff et al. (1998) or Technographics Goolsbee (2000) . The Forrester data is widely respected in the industry and private sector companies pay significant amounts of money to get access to it.
For each respondent the dataset contains demographic information, including gender, race, income, education, age, marital status, whether they have children under 18, whether they use a computer at work, whether they run a business from home, and their state and broadly defined metropolitan area of residence. The dataset also contains information on how much 10 they watch television, their ownership of various electronic goods, and even some attitude variables such as ratings from one to ten of how much they "like technology". All of this information is gathered in December of 1997.
For anyone with a computer in 1997, the survey also contains information on how many computers they have, how many they have ever had, when they bought their first computer, when they bought their (up to) three most recent computers, how often they use their computer and whether they have Internet access. For those without computers, the survey includes (self-reported) information on how likely they are to buy a computer in the next year and what share of their friends and family use computers.
Using this information, we are able to calculate what fraction of people in a city had a computer in 1996 (assuming no one moved) and what share of 1996 non-owners bought their first computer in 1997. We cannot get a true panel, however, because household information such as family composition is applicable only at the time of the survey. Compared to non-owners, owners at the beginning of 1997 were better educated, richer, and so on. Likewise, among those not owning at the start of 1997, those adopting during 1997 were better educated, richer, etc. At the start of 1997, 39.7% of households reported owning; at the end of 1997, 44.6% of the households reported owning a home computer. By comparison, the 10 The respondents are divided into 208 metropolitan areas that are defined by the television market they reside in. These areas are generally larger than comparable SMSAs. The San Francisco area, for example, includes all of the Bay Area. 11 The sample in the second group consists of those in the last two groups. No households reported going from owning at the beginning of 1997 to not owning at the end of 1997.
Electronic Industries Association estimated 40% ownership during 1997, and the Current Population Survey estimated 37%. adopts. If p is household i's reservation price in year t and p is the market price facing
household i in year t, then
Consider a household that buys in year t. Since this is the first purchase, this is the first year in which the market price of a computer has been below the household's reservation price.
This may have come about because the market price fell, the household's reservation price rose, or some combination. We specify that 12
(1) Probability(y = 1) = CITY% + x + x + c + u .
We use a linear probability model for simplicity, particularly in the IV context. Our basic results were the same using a probit model.
CITY% is the fraction of households in the city having a computer in the previous year. If t" there are local learning and network externalities, then nonowners living in areas where owners are prevalent will be more likely to buy one (controlling for all other factors), leading to 0. This is analogous to epidemiology models in which an infectious disease spreads -more quickly the larger the fraction of the population infected. In the marketing literature, this is known as the Bass (1969) model. We are applying this model to individual-level data, but the model has also been applied to city, state, and country level data. Karshenas and 13 Stoneman (1993) also implement a hazard rate formulation on micro data, in their case for individual firms adopting numerically controlled machines.
The x are household observables. In the basic specification these are age, education, o i income, gender, race, marital status, the presence of children, whether the respondent uses a computer at work, and whether the respondent runs a business from home. There is no time subscript since we have this data for 1997 only. Among nonowners, those with the highest reservation prices might be expected to be those with the most income, education, etc. They will therefore be more likely to adopt if the market price falls. of their propensity to own computers, they may sort on characteristics that are correlated with that propensity. To contribute to x , however, the sorting must be over and above sorting on price of computers, the density of computer stores, and advertising for computers. These city attributes may be endogenous responses to local computer purchases, a form of network externalities but on the production side rather than on the consumption side. Finally, the u it are idiosyncratic household unobservables, which could be correlated with household
The unobservable terms in (1) clarify the potential sources of bias in a regression of y it on CITY% and x . If the CITY% is positively correlated with x + c conditional on the x ,
then the estimated local effect ( ) will be biased upward. If people in Silicon Valley love -s technology, for example, they may be more likely to own computers and to buy them even if they do not yet own them. This will spuriously make the spillover seem large. On the other hand, the estimates may be biased downward because of survivor bias (Heckman and Singer, 1985) . If the only people living in Silicon Valley who do not own computers in 1997 actually hate technology and will buy a computer, this will create a downward bias in our never estimated . In either case, the use of instrumental variables is necessary.
-s
IV. OLS Results
We start by presenting the cross-sectional regression of household on city ownership ownership. The dependent variable is a {0,1} for whether the individual owns a computer and the independent variable of interest is the mean ownership rates of other people in the metropolitan area. Column (1) of Table 1 shows that a household is more likely to own if other households in the same metro area own (coefficient 0.294, standard error 0.034, tstatistic 8.7), even controlling for household characteristics such as education, income, age, and whether a computer is used at work. This coefficient is likely to be biased upward because of unobservable city features and correlated household unobservables. In contrast to this regression of ownership on contemporaneous ownership of others in the city, we now turn to regressions of on of others in the city.
first-time adoption lagged ownership
We are more interested in the impact of lagged ownership on the probability of firsttime adoption (among those who have not adopted through the previous year) for two reasons.
First, it may mitigate the bias from correlated household unobservables. By looking only at non-owners and asking if they are more likely to adopt if surrounded by more owners, we are isolating people who are demonstrably different from computer owners. Second and more important, the economic logic of learning and network externalities suggests that the stock should affect the flow. In the case of learning, a bigger stock means more owners from which to learn how to use and buy a computer, promoting adoption. In the case of network externalities, a bigger stock means a bigger network in which to participate. 14 In column (2) of Table 2 we look at individuals who do not own a computer in 1996
and ask whether they are more likely to buy one in 1997 if there were many owners in their city in 1996. This is the specification of equation (1) 14 In theory, what should matter is the expected size of the network over the entire lifetime of the computer. This could also apply to learning if adopters learn from other owners even after they have adopted. This is difficult to deal with appropriately since the path of computer ownership will be strongly affected by the hard-to-predict future rate of decline of computer prices. 15 We obtained very similar results using the share of people in a city who either own a computer at home or use a computer at work for CITY% (rather than just the share who own a computer at home). We also obtained similar results when we regressed 1996 adoption on 1995 ownership, 1995 adoption on 1994 ownership, and the selfreported probability of buying in 1998 on 1997 ownership. 16 All of the standard errors in the paper are corrected for the fact that the CITY% does not vary by household. 17 Coefficients on the demographic variables, not listed in Table 2 , have predictable signs. Households with more income and education are more likely to buy their first computer. Using a computer at work, running a business from home, and having children in the household are also associated with a higher probability of first purchase.
For example, having a child between 6 and 17 in the household means a 4.2 percentage point higher probability of buying. The largest marginal effect (as well as the largest t-statistic) is on using a computer at work. This raises the probability of purchase by 7 percentage points, almost doubling it at the mean of the covariates.
within a city to get
where f is the fraction of city c households who buy their first computer in year t and F (= ct c,t" CITY% ) is the fraction of households in city c who own a computer in year t 1. i.e., f and t"
F are the density and cumulative density, respectively, of computer adoption (first-time computer purchase). When 0, the hazard is rising in the fraction of the population who -own in the previous period. For non-owners, the 1997 hazard rate in our sample was approximately 8%, so the population-weighted left-hand-side of (2) averaged 8% across our cities. Given our baseline estimate of = 0.10 and an average F across cities of 40% in - The spillover interpretation has the strong prediction that the adoption rate should be increasing in CITY% over the range of CITY%. This is not shared by most entire distributions that might characterize reservation prices (conditional on observables). A uniform distribution would imply a monotonically declining hazard rate. Any single-peaked, symmetric distribution, such as a normal distribution, would imply a declining hazard rate over at least the top half of the distribution. A log normal distribution (as seems to characterize income, e.g.) would imply a declining hazard over even more of the distribution, as would any other single-peaked, right-skewed distribution. Over these ranges this effect would lead to a negative coefficient on CITY%.
A glance at Figure 2 reveals no obvious tendency for the slope coefficient to vary with CITY%. We test this formally by adding two interaction variables to the regression: the interaction of CITY%(t-1) with a dummy for the city being in the top quartile of CITY%(t-1) and with a dummy for the city being in the bottom quartile of CITY%(t-1). Column (3) of Table 2 shows that neither interaction variable is statistically or economically significant meaning they are not different than the baseline coefficient. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the slope is the same in the top and bottom quartiles of CITY% (p-value 0.53). We also tried this regression for other cuts of the data and in all cases we found a significant positive coefficient on CITY% in every segment.
In short, as predicted by the presence of 19 spillovers, the adoption rate appears to be increasing in the CITY% across all ranges.
We next add variables plausibly correlated with an individual's sophistication. If the results are due to unobserved technological sophistication rather than spillovers then adding these variables ought to reduce the coefficient on CITY%. In column (4) of Table 2 we add 23 additional controls to our original set of 10 demographic controls: three interactions of the demographic variables (income*education, education*age, and income*age); seven dummies for ownership of other consumer electronics (satellite dish, big-screen TV, cordless phone, CD player, component stereo system, VCR, and answering machine); three "attitude toward 19 We found the same effect using interactions with the top and bottom decile rather than quartile. Neither coefficient was significantly different from the baseline coefficient and we could not reject that the top and bottom were the same (p-value 0.42). We also tried an interaction splitting the sample only in half. We found that the top half of the CITY% sample had a smaller (but still positive) point estimate, and the difference was only borderline significant (p-value 0.11).
technology" variables (self-ratings from one to ten of how well the statements "I like technology," "technology is important to me," and "I like to spend time learning about new technology products" describe the respondent's personality); five dummies for categories for hours of TV watching; and five dummies for wealth categories.
Of the 23 additional controls, 17 are statistically significant: nine at the 1% level, five more at the 5% level, and three more at the 10% level. The three individually most significant are ownership of a CD player (t-statistic = 9.5), "technology is important to me" (t-statistic 6.5), and ownership of a cordless phone (t-statistic = 6.3). The inclusion of these extra, significant controls causes the coefficient on CITY% to fall slightly from 0.119 to 0.111 (standard errors equal to 0.022). Since we think these additional controls are likely to be 20 correlated with a household's unobserved sophistication (and permanent income), the fact that the CITY% coefficient survives almost wholly intact makes us more confident that the estimated CITY% coefficient does not merely reflect the correlation between CITY% and x .
u it
We next add variables motivated by the debate over the impact of computers on wages.
DiNardo and Pischke (1997) show that, while using a computer seems to raise wages, so do using a pencil and sitting down while working. Further, controlling for pencil use and working while sitting often lowers the estimated wage effect of computers substantially. They argue that this casts doubt on a causal interpretation of the computer coefficient.
To apply this to our context, column (5) of Table 2 adds to the regression of column (4) the fraction of households who own each of seven consumer electronic goods in the city (satellite dish, big-screen TV, cordless phone, CD player, component stereo system, VCR, and answering machine). We do not think there are plausible learning or network benefits for computer adoption arising from widespread use of stereos, VCRs, and so on. Thus if these variables matter and lower the coefficient on the fraction of people owning computers, it would cast doubt on a spillover interpretation. We find in column (5) that the results change little. The local effect of computer ownership is still positive and significant (t-statistic of 3.4) and the magnitude is the same as in the baseline regression. Although we do not list the other coefficients for space reasons, none of the seven ownership fractions is significantly positive, and the same is true when we add them individually rather than collectively. To summarize, 21 adding variables likely to be correlated with unobservable sophistication (and permanent income) does not change the estimated importance of spillovers.
V. Instrumental Variables
To address potential simultaneity problems with estimating local spillovers, we now carry out instrumental variables estimation. We use as instruments the of the 10 city means household variables (education, income, age, and so on; see Table 1 ). Positive local externalities mean that, conditional on its characteristics, a household should be more likely to buy its first computer if it is surrounded by households with observables favorable to computer ownership. For example, a childless household surrounded by households with kids should be more likely to adopt than a childless household surrounded by childless households. Thus the city means should be relevant instruments, and they are (the 1st-stage R is 0.88).
#
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The city mean observables (x ) will not be valid instruments if they are correlated with o c household unobservables (x ). One might worry that they are positively correlated because, u i say, cities with lots of children are filled with the more technologically savvy. But household observables are included in the regression. This means that any correlation between unobservables and observables should not bias the coefficient on CITY%, only the " coefficients on the observables themselves. For example, the coefficient on kids in the household should absorb any correlation between the household's sophistication and the presence of kids. For this reason, observables should not be correlated with x city mean u i 21 We also re-estimated the column (5) specification with dummies for 15 income categories, five education categories, and three age categories rather than single variables for income, education, and age. The coefficient actually rose a negligible amount, from 0.119 to 0.121. 22 Case and Katz (1991) develop this insight and propose a likelihood ratio test of, in our example, whether the city means for the observables matter for individual decisions. When we did this test using our data, we easily rejected the hypothesis that there are no local effects. simply because cities with kids tend to be filled with technological sophisticates. It would have to be that, controlling for whether a household includes kids, a household tends to be more savvy the higher the fraction of households in the city with kids.
As column (2) of Table 3 shows, using these 10 city mean variables as instruments gives a similar answer to OLS: 0.115 vs. the 0.104 OLS estimate in column (1). The CITY% coefficient is still estimated quite precisely (t-statistic of 6.1). Importantly, we cannot reject the nine overidentifying restrictions at the five percent level (p-value of 0.16). The weakest 23 a priori case for city mean validity is likely to be for the city mean income, education, and work variables (use a computer at work or run a business from home). Column (3) drops the work variables from the instrument set, column (4) drops the income and education variables from the instrument set, and column (5) drops the work, income, and education variables from the instrument set. In every case the IV estimate lies between 0.11 and 0.13 with a t-statistic of at least 5.5 (compared to the 0.12 coefficient, 6.1 t-statistic with all 10 city means as instrument). Finally, we think the strongest case for validity might be made for the a priori city mean % of households with kids age 6 to 17. When we use only this variable as an instrument in column (6) of Table 3 , we still find a significant CITY% coefficient, albeit with larger standard errors. Adoption is more likely if a household is surrounded by households with kids, controlling for whether the household has kids or not (and household income, education, etc.): the coefficient is 0.168 with a standard error of 0.053 and t-statistic of 3.2.
To summarize, the instrumental variables results do not support the interpretation of the CITY% coefficient as resulting from simultaneity bias.
VI. Identifying the Type of Network
If the CITY% coefficient arises from spillovers then we would like to know more about the channel and nature of the spillover. In this section we try to determine whether certain users are more influential than others, whether local schools are an important channel, whether local computer retailers play a special role, and whether any externalities might operate through the use of software, e-mail or the Internet.
A. Spillovers by Type of Owner
Using the information in the survey on how many computers a household has ever owned, we divide city ownership into two groups: people who have owned two or more computers in their lifetime (19% of all households at the end of 1996) and people who have owned only one in their lifetime (also 19% of all households at the end of 1996). We would expect non-owners to have more traits in common with people owning their first computers than with experienced owners, so if the correlated unobservables explanation is correct there should be particularly high rates of adoption among non-users in places where there are many first time owners and the coefficient on that groups should be larger. On the other hand, if the spillover explanation is correct, since multiple-computer owners are likely to be better informed, have more software to share, and so on, the coefficient on experienced users should be larger. The results, presented in column (1) of Table 4 , show that multiple-lifetimepurchasers are substantially more influential. The coefficient on the fraction of city households that are multiple-lifetime-purchasers is 0.123 (standard error 0.024, t-statistic 5.3), while the coefficient for single-purchasers is 0.061 (standard error 0.056, t-statistic 1.1).
Similarly, in column (2) of Table 4 we classify computer owners into two usage groups. We define households who report using a computer more than 20 days per month as "heavy users" and those using it fewer than 20 days per month as "light users." From this we decompose the CITY% into the share of the city that uses it more than 20 days per month and the share that uses it fewer than 20 days per month (these average 26% and 12% of households, respectively). Again, we expect the unobserved traits of the light users to be most like those of the non-owners, whereas any spillovers should be more important from the heavy users. Again, the results show that the coefficient is much larger on the group that is less likely to share unobserved common traits (0.137 on heavy users versus -0.007 on light users).
Indeed, the light users seem to confer no significant spillovers at all.
These results cast further doubt on an "unobserved common traits" interpretation, and suggest any spillovers arise disproportionately from experienced, intensive users.
B. Local Schools
One potential explanation for the city ownership coefficient is that it is being driven by computer use in local schools. School districts in which lots of families own computers may, for example, draft curricula that encourage non-owning families to buy a computer. In column (3) of Table 4 we include only households school-age children (hence the smaller without number of observations and the absence of the children demographic control). The coefficient on city ownership (of all households, those with and without kids 6 to 17) is again significant and has a similar magnitude (0.094 versus 0.104 baseline). The school system cannot directly explain the local spillovers for these households. The school system may be an important conduit of learning and network benefits of computers, but this regression suggests those benefits are not restricted to families with children in school.
C. Local Prices
Another possible explanation of our local effect is that cities with computer owners have large numbers of people working in the computer industry, or they may have lower computer store prices, denser networks of computer stores, and cheaper access to the Internet. This may increase the probability of buying and thus explain our coefficient. This local 24 effect could itself arise because of network externalities. Cities with lots of computer-owning 24 Fixed city price differences are actually not sufficient to generate a positive correlation between the CITY% and the adoption rate of non-owners. For non-owners, the local market price has up to now exceeded their reservation price. If the distribution of reservation prices across households is uniform between 0 and P (so that low price cities have higher ownership), then low price cities would need to have more rapidly falling computer prices in percentage terms. i.e. one would need price divergence, not just price level differences. If the distribution of reservation prices is non-uniform, however, then level differences in city prices could produce positive or negative local effects.
households may endogenously have a dense network of computer retailers and local phone numbers to access the Internet, thereby attracting new adopters.
To test this explanation we examine the geographic areas in more detail. Thus far we have been grouping households according to metropolitan area. For each person we also have the state they live in, and many of the metropolitan areas cross state boundaries. The New York City area, for example, includes people in New Jersey and Connecticut. We therefore create a narrower local area, the "city-state". This splits a city like New York into three different city-states: New York-New York, New York-New Jersey, and New YorkConnecticut. We then create the fraction of ownership within each of these city-states.
In column (4) of Table 4 we repeat our standard regression but with the ownership shares both by city-state and by city. The evidence is quite clear that the effect is at the more local, city-state level (coefficient 0.094 on the CITY-STATE% vs. only 0.011 on the CITY%).
In column (5) we add city dummies which should absorb any metropolitan area level differences in industry composition, Internet access, computer store availability, computer advertising, and so on. The coefficient on the local spillover remains large, positive and significant (the coefficient is 0.088 with a standard error of 0.033). Thus the local effect cannot be explained by differences in any citywide features. To explain the results, prices 25 etc. would have to differ systematically metropolitan areas. Because of these results, in within the regressions that follow we will use the CITY-STATE% rather than the CITY% (although very similar results obtain with CITY%)..
Of course, adjacent city-states may indeed differ in computer prices, Internet access, and so on. Fortunately, we are able to examine the issue from another angle using the information given by end-of-1997 non-owners on how likely they are to buy a computer in the next year (1998). These same respondents were also asked how many of their family and 25 presence of computer owners affects adoption through the A variant of the local price hypothesis is that the market for used computers. Cities with many owners may have lots of inexpensive or free old computers. Our data contain information for some respondents on the type of store in which they purchased their computer. Using this information we found the same spillovers from local ownership looking only at the decision to buy a new computer. friends own personal computers (potential answers to the latter being "all", "most", "some", "very few", and "none").
Column (1) of Table 5 shows a regression of the reported likelihood of buying on dummies for the share of friends and family that use computers, the fraction of the city-state that own computers, and our standard list of household observables. The results show that, the larger the fraction of family and friends that own a computer, the higher the reported likelihood of a first purchase in the next year. Going from "none" to "all" of friends and family owning computers raises the reported likelihood by 0.21, a considerable amount relative to the mean likelihood of 0.25. The friends and family dummies are highly significant, with t-statistics ranging from 9 to 40. Importantly, their inclusion renders the estimated spillover at the city-state level small and insignificant: 0.032 with a standard error of 0.019.
(The regression with the same dependent variable but no friends and family dummies yielded a coefficient of 0.105, with a standard error of 0.026.) Column (2) of Table 5 shows that adding city-state dummies does not materially change the estimated effects of ownership by friends and family.
The fact that friends and family dummies eclipse the CITY-STATE% represents, in our view, strong evidence against the view that unobserved city-state features (prices, Internet access, computer ads, computer stored density) explain the significance of the CITY-STATE% in other regressions. For variables such as prices to explain the importance of the CITY%, the prices would need to be more specific to the household and its friends and family than to the city-state in which the household resides.
These "friends and family" results could, of course, also be explained by common unobserved traits among friends and family. Correlation with unobserved traits is surely responsible for some of the explanatory power of the friends and family dummies. But the 26 26 Comparing the R of 0.26 with friends and family variables (Table 5) to the R 's of around .06 in Table 4 2 2 overstates their explanatory power. Table 5 uses a more continuous dependent variable (likelihood of buying for the first time in 1998 of 0, 0.l, ..., 0.9) than the other regressions (dependent variable equal to 1 for adopters, 0 for non-adopters), and hence naturally has a higher R . The proper comparison is to a regression with the same correlation between the friends and family dummies and the CITY% need not owe to common unobserved traits. We presented several lines of evidence that cast doubt on the common traits interpretation of the CITY% coefficient. We think the evidence, taken together, suggests that friends and family variables render the CITY% coefficient insignificant because friends and family with computers are the channel by which the CITY% enters significantly. It seems plausible that the spillovers occur among friends and family members precisely the people a household interacts with most. Friends and family may be the people with whom one exchanges most e-mail from home, most software used at home, etc. 27 D. Software, Internet and e-Mail Networks
In Table 6 we present a series of regressions, each of which breaks the CITY-STATE% into computer users who do and do not report using their computer frequently for specific activities. If there are networks associated with sharing software files, for example, we might expect that spreadsheet or word processing users would have more influence on new adopters than those who do not use those types of software. The first five columns of Table 6 reveal that spillovers from computer owners are equally strong from users and non-users of word processing, spreadsheets, games, graphics, and family budgeting precisely the types of software where file sharing might be prevalent.
Column (6) shows that spillovers do not appear to be from users of home computers for work. The spillovers appear larger from those who do not use their computers to do work at home than from those who do, although the difference is not significant at the 10% level.
the friends and family dummies noticeably improve the fit, their tremendous significance also comes at the expense of the significance of the other demographic variables. 27 We do not know how geographically local friends and family typically are, but the learning and network stories involve interaction, not proximity per se. We do not give these friends and family results a more central place in the paper because friends and family computer ownership is only asked of households not owning a computer at the end of 1997. Thus, for example, we do not have this information for households who actually adopted a computer in 1997. Moreover, we cannot observe the fraction of friends and family who use computers intensively, etc., whereas we can observe the fraction of households in the city who do so.
More significantly, columns (7) and (8) of Table 6 are consistent with the view that computers are components of local communication and information networks. In these columns we find that users who frequently use the Internet and e-mail appear more influential.
The coefficient on Internet households is 0.134 compared to only 0.046 on other households (the p-value that the coefficients are the same is 0.07). The coefficient on e-mail users is 0.144 versus 0.030 on those who do not use e-mail (p-value 0.03 on their equality). These are suggestive of local communications networks but are also consistent with local learning if
Internet and e-mail users are more knowledgeable than other computer owners, or are more active in communicating with others. 28
VII. Conclusion
Using micro data on 110,000 U.S. households in 1997, we find that local spillovers are important for household computer adoption: households are more likely to buy their first computer when a high fraction of people around them already own computers (and especially when a high fraction of people around them are experienced, intensive users). Our point estimates imply that such spillovers could play a quantitatively important role in the spread of home computers, perhaps doubling the rate of adoption.
Applying a battery of tests, we find that this effect is robust and unlikely to be explained by common unobserved local traits or by alternative explanations such as local computer prices, local industry composition, local schools, or peer pressure. The networks do not appear to be tied to any particular type of software nor to the use of an at-home computer for work. Instead, networks seem related to use of the Internet and e-mail, consistent with computers as the hub of information and communications networks.
If these spillovers are, indeed, externalities, they may provide backing for efforts to close the "Digital Divide" between those with and without Internet and computer access. Table  1 were included as controls in all regressions (and each variable was always highly significant). Each regression is a linear probability model. Column (1) regresses ownership of the individual in 1997 on the fraction of the city owning in 1997. Columns (2) through (5) regress the decision to buy a computer in 1997 (conditional on not owning a computer through 1996) on the share of the city owning a computer in 1996. More Controls: 3 interactions of the demographic variables (income*education, education*age, and income*age); 7 dummies for ownership of other consumer electronics (satellite dish, big-screen TV, cordless phone, CD player, component stereo system, VCR, and answering machine); 3 "attitude toward technology" variables (self-ratings from one to ten of how well the statements "I like technology," "technology is important to me," and "I like to spend time learning about new technology products" describe the respondent's personality); 5 dummies for categories for hours of TV watching; and 5 dummies for wealth categories. CITY% for electronics: fraction of households in the city who own each of the seven consumer electronic goods (satellite dish, big-screen TV, cordless phone, CD player, component stereo system, VCR, and answering machine). Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. t denotes the t-statistic. Each regression is a linear probability model. 10 demographic variables were included as controls in all regressions. Column (2) uses as instruments the city means of the 10 demographic variables (income, education, age, and dummies for kids age 6-17, female, single, Asian, non-Asian minority, use a computer at work, and run a business from home). Column (3) uses the first eight of these as instruments (i.e., excludes use a computer at work and run a business from home variables). Column (4) uses the last eight of these as instruments (i.e., excludes income and education). Column (5) uses the middle six of these (i.e., excludes the work variables and the income and education variables). Column (6) uses only kids age 6-17 as an instrument. Table 1 were included as controls in all regressions (except column 3, which excluded the kids 6-17 variable). Each regression is a linear probability model. Column (3) restricts the sample to individuals with no children. Table 1 were included as controls in all regressions. Each regression is a linear probability model. The first row is the share of the city-state which owns a computer and frequently uses their computer for the purpose listed at the top of the column. The second row is the share of computer users who do not frequently use their computer for that purpose.
